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Note 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: 
Striking a Delicate Balance Between Innovation 
and Accessibility 
Ude Lu* 
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009 (BPCIA, also known as the Biosimilar Act) was signed 
into law in 2010 by President Barack Obama as part of the 
healthcare reform bill.1 The central mission of the BPCIA is 
two-fold: (1) providing sufficient incentives for continuous 
innovations in biologic therapies (i.e., promoting innovation); 
and (2) lowering the price of biologic therapies (i.e., promoting 
accessibility).2 To promote innovation, the BPCIA provides 
twelve-year Food and Drug Administration (FDA) exclusivity to 
innovator biologics.3 This twelve-year FDA exclusivity prevents 
generic biologics, also known as follow-on biologics (FOBs), 
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 1. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 7001, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010). The Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act (BPCIA) was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010). 
 2. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act § 7001(b), 124 Stat. at 
804 (“It is the sense of the Senate that a biosimilars pathway balancing 
innovations and consumer interests [i.e., accessibility] should be 
established.”). 
 3. Id. § 7002(k)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 805. 
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from being approved.4 To promote accessibility, the BPCIA 
provides an abbreviated pathway for FOBs—the abbreviated 
biologic license application (ABLA).5 The ABLA allows FOB 
manufacturers to cut short the time and the expensive cost of 
clinical testing by referring to innovator biologics’ clinical data 
to establish safety and efficacy.6 
The goal of this Note is to discuss the advantages and 
drawbacks of the mechanisms established in the BPCIA and to 
suggest modifications to strike a better balance between 
innovation and accessibility. Part I of this Note introduces the 
legal and scientific background of the BPCIA and Hatch-
Waxman Act in order to engage in further analyses. Part II of 
this Note analyzes the competing interests of innovation and 
accessibility and suggests a novel six-year data exclusivity and 
a six-to-twelve-year market exclusivity regulatory scheme. This 
Note concludes that the current design of the BPCIA tips too 
favorably toward innovation and compromises accessibility. 
The suggested six-year data exclusivity and six-to-twelve-year 
market exclusivity regulatory scheme potentially strike a 
better balance between innovation and accessibility. 
I. BACKGROUND: INTRODUCING THE LEGAL AND 
SCIENTIFIC BACKGOUND OF THE BPCIA AND THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
The BPCIA is highly analogous to the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act introduced in 
1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, which established 
                                                          
 4. Id. (stating that the Commissioner of the FDA may not make effective 
an approval of a generic biologic until a twelve-year period after the 
referenced biologic was approved). Follow-on biologic (FOB) essentially means 
the generic version of a biologic pharmaceutical. Agencies, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), and commentators have adopted the term “follow-on 
biologic” to distinguish it from “generic drug” (i.e., a small-molecule drug that 
is bioequivalent to a reference small-molecule drug). This is because it is 
agreed among scientific communities that it is impossible to make a “generic 
biologic” that is bioequivalent to a reference biologic, as one can with small-
molecule drugs. Thus, the term FOB is adopted to emphasize biosimilar and 
distinguish from bioequivalent. 
 5. Id. § 7002, 124 Stat. at 805. Section 7002 was subsequently codified in 
42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (defining Licensure of Biological Products (LBP)). LBP is an 
abbreviated pathway to get FDA approval on generic versions of biologic 
pharmaceuticals. Commentators usually refer to a LBP as an abbreviated 
biologic license application (ABLA) in recognition of the highly similar 
structure with abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA) established in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (Supp. V 2011). 
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the abbreviated approval process for small molecule drugs.7 
Similar to the goals of the BPCIA, the Hatch-Waxman Act tries 
to balance two competing interests: innovation and 
accessibility.8 To incentivize innovation, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act provides patent term extension (PTE) that prolongs the 
patent exclusivity period so that innovator companies have an 
extended period of market monopoly.9 On the other side of the 
scale, to increase public access to drugs, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act established an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to 
introduce competing generic drugs through a fast approval 
process.10 The Hatch-Waxman Act establishes the modern 
generic drug industry and was incredibly successful in 
increasing the accessibility of small molecule drugs.11 In 1984, 
when the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced, generic drug use 
                                                          
 7. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). The provisions of 
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) were subsequently codified in 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j). ANDAs are similar to 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) ABLAs. Both ANDAs 
and ABLAs allow generic drug companies to reference the clinical data 
originally submitted by the innovator drug companies to establish the safety 
and efficacy of the generic drugs/biologics. This saves generic drug companies 
a tremendous amount of time and money by avoiding full-scale clinical trials 
so that generic drugs/FOBs can enter the market quickly after the patent 
terms of the innovator drugs expire. One major difference between ANDAs 
and ABLAs is that ANDAs regulate small-molecule drugs and ABLAs regulate 
biologics. 
 8. Hatch-Waxman Act, 98 Stat. at 1585 (“To amend the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug applications, to 
amend title 35, United States Code, to authorize the extensions of the patents 
for certain regulated products, and for other purposes.” (emphasis added)). 
The “revised procedure” for new drug applications refers to ANDAs. ANDAs 
increase drug accessibility by introducing generic drug competition quickly 
after the patents covering the reference drug expire. The “extension of patent” 
term refers to patent term extension (PTE), which extends the patent term by 
50% of the FDA approval time. PTE is to incentivize innovation. See Colleen 
Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 418 (2011). 
 9. See Hatch-Waxman Act § 201. 
 10. See Hatch-Waxman Act § 101. 
 11. Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to 
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7–13 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief 
Counsel, U.S. Food & Drug Administration). The FDA stated that the Hatch-
Waxman Act was working well. Since the Hatch-Waxman Act’s passage in 
1984, 10,000 generic drugs have entered the market. By 2003, 50% of the 
prescriptions were filled by generic drugs. Id. 
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was less than 20% of all prescription drug use.12 By 2010, the 
percentage increased to 78%.13 The popularity of generic drugs 
drove down small molecule drug prices by an average of almost 
75%.14 However, the Hatch-Waxman Act regulates only small 
molecule drugs, not biologics.15 This is probably because, as of 
1984, biologic pharmaceuticals were still in their infancy.16 In 
other words, there was no abbreviated approval process for 
biologics before the BPCIA was signed into law in 2010.17 
A. SMALL MOLECULE DRUGS V. BIOLOGICS 
Biologics are very different from small molecule drugs. 
Small molecule drugs are chemically synthesized.18 Biologics 
                                                          
 12. Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1993 (2007). 
 13. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN 
THE UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF 2010, at 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.imshealth.com/imshealth/Global/Content/IMS%20Institute/Docum
ents/IHII_UseOfMed_report%20.pdf. 
 14. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC 
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 32–33 (1998). 
 15. Corporate Chronology, GENENTECH, http://www.gene.com/media/
company-information/chronology (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). In modern 
biotechnology, recombinant DNA is the major technology used to create 
biologics. The first recombinant DNA biologic, human insulin made by 
Genentech, was approved by the FDA in 1982, only two years before the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984. Thus, at the time the Hatch-
Waxman Act was enacted, there was no need for an abbreviated pathway for 
FOBs, because at that time the innovator biologics are all protected by 
patents. See Trader Thoughts, Biogenerics: Not Yet a Reality in the U.S., 
SEEKING ALPHA (Dec. 24, 2007), http://seekingalpha.com/article/58230-
biogenerics-not-yet-a-reality-in-the-u-s. 
 16. Corporate Chronology, supra note 15. 
 17. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: THE 
LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41483.pdf (stating that prior to the 
enactment of the BPCIA, there was no generally-applicable abbreviated 
statutory pathway for follow-on biologics). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“[T]he term ‘biological 
product’ means a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, 
blood component or derivative, allergenic product, [protein (except any 
chemically synthesized polypeptide),] or analogous product, or arsphenamine 
or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic 
compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or 
condition of human beings.”); see also SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 5 
(stating that chemical drugs are based on small molecules that typically 
contain dozens of atoms, while biologics are based on macro-molecules that 
may consist of millions of atoms). 
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are the products of living cells.19 Biologics include: “therapeutic 
serums, toxins, antitoxins, vaccines, blood, blood components or 
derivatives, allergenic products, proteins, and viruses.”20 
Compared to small molecule drugs, biologics have much larger 
molecular weights and much more complicated three 
dimensional structures.21 Biologics are usually proteins and 
antibodies which possess high binding affinity with specific 
substrates.22 Unlike small molecule drugs, which usually have 
larger tolerance to heat or contamination in the production 
process, biologics are extremely heat-sensitive and susceptible 
to microbial contamination.23 A minor change in the 
manufacturing process, such as a minor change in temperature 
of cell culture, can change the overall characteristic of a final 
biologic product.24 Thus, quality control for biologics is much 
more costly and complex than for small molecule drugs.25 
Traditionally, biologics were extracted from animals or 
humans bodies.26 This production method is limited in 
quantity, and obviously undesirable.27 In 1973, the 
development of recombinant DNA technology made mass 
production of biologics possible.28 Since then, the medical 
                                                          
 19. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 5. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i). 
 21. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 2–3. 
 22. Simon D. Roger, Biosimilars: How Similar or Dissimilar Are They?, 11 
NEPHROLOGY 341, 343 (2006) (stating that in assessing efficacy of biosimilars, 
receptor-binding affinity is an important index). 
 23. What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CBER/ucm133077.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 3013) (“In contrast to most 
drugs that are chemically synthesized and their structure is known, most 
biologics are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized. 
Biological products, including those manufactured by biotechnology, tend to be 
heat sensitive and susceptible to microbial contamination. Therefore, it is 
necessary to use aseptic principles from initial manufacturing steps, which is 
also in contrast to most conventional drugs.”). 
 24. Michal Nowicki, Basic Facts About Biosimilars, 30 KIDNEY BLOOD 
PRESSURE RES. 267, 268 (2007). 
 25. Id. 
 26. What Is a Biological Product?, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194516.htm (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Biotechnology at 25: The Founders, U. CAL. BERKELEY LIBR., 
http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/Exhibits/Biotech/25.html (last updated May 23, 
2000); see also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
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importance of biologics has grown exponentially.29 The FDA 
states: “biological products often represent the cutting-edge of 
biomedical research and, in time, may offer the most effective 
means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions 
that presently have no other treatments available.”30 
Conditions currently treated by biologics include diseases such 
as cancer, arthritis, chronic plaque psoriasis, anemia, and 
chronic renal failure.31 Commentators called biologics “the 
wonder drug” of the 21st Century.32 In 2007 there were 400 
biologics treating more than 200 conditions.33 By 2011, there 
were more than 900 biologics in various clinical trial phases 
targeting more than 100 diseases.34 There is little doubt that 
biologics will make up the majority of pharmaceutical therapies 
to treat the most difficult diseases in the future.35 
The economic importance of biologics also grew 
exponentially in the pharmaceutical industry.36 In 2000, 
biologics sales accounted for 11% of all drug sales in the United 
States. By 2005, that figure rose to 18%, and by 2010, it grew to 
26% of total consumer spending on pharmaceuticals.37 
                                                          
 29. Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents 
Passé? 6 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/
context/vincent_roth/article/1000/type/native/viewcontent (“In 2002, biologics 
sales accounted for 11% of all U.S. drug sales. By 2006, spending on biologics 
totaled $54 billion in the U.S.-approximately 20% of total spending on 
pharmaceuticals. By 2010, biologics were estimated at 26% of the total cost of 
pharmaceuticals . . . with sales of biologics expected at over $60 billion.”). 
 30. What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 23. 
 31. Biologic Medical Product, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Biologic_medical_product (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
 32. Zach Patton, Complex Rx: Biologic Meds Are the Wonder Drugs of Our 
Time. Can We Afford Them?, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/
topics/politics/Complex-Rx.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Grady Forrer, 900 New Medicines in Development Show the 
Biotechnology Medical Revolution Is Going Strong, CATALYST (Sept. 14, 2011, 
11:18 AM), http://www.phrma.org/catalyst/900-new-medicines-development-
show-biotechnology-medical-revolution-going-strong/. 
 35. See What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 23 
(stating that biologics represent the forefront of biomedical research and may 
be used to treat a variety of medical conditions for which no other treatments 
are available). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Nowicki, supra note 24, at 267. 
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B. THE URGE FOR BIOSIMILARS BEFORE 2010 
During 2003 and 2004, patents protecting several multi-
billion dollar sale biologics expired.38 Yet innovator companies 
faced no market competition because, at that time, there was 
no abbreviated pathway to approve FOBs.39 Since then, there 
has been increasing pressure on Congress to provide for an 
abbreviated approval pathway (i.e., biosimilar pathway, similar 
to ANDA in the Hatch-Waxman Act to approve FOBs).40 The 
pressure on Congress intensified after both the European 
Union (EU) and Canada implemented their versions of 
biosimilar pathways in 2004 and 2006 respectively.41 In 2004, 
Dr. Carole Ben-Maimon, President of Barr Research, Inc., 
testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee: “[G]eneric 
competition for biotech pharmaceuticals has the potential to 
offer consumers dramatic and substantial savings, while also 
lowering America’s healthcare bill.”42 Kathleen Jaeger, the 
                                                          
 38. Trader Thoughts, supra note 15 (“Patent for Biogen’s Avonex (2006 
sales: $1Bn) expired in 2003, Eli Lilly’s Humatrope ($390M) expired in 2003, 
Genentech’s Humulin ($1Bn) expired in 2004, while the blockbuster anemia 
drug—Amgen’s Epogen ($2.5 Bn) is set to expire in 2012.”). 
 39. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 5 (stating that prior to the 
enactment of the BPCIA in 2010, there was no generally applicable 
abbreviated statutory pathway for FOBs); see also What We Do, DRAGONFLY 
SCIENCES, http://www.dragonflysciences.com/whatWeDo/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2013) (stating that monoclonal antibody (mAB) 
manufacturers (mAB is a kind of biologic) have enjoyed market monopoly due 
to both patent protection and the lack of regulatory mechanisms to approve 
generic versions of biologics). 
 40. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO ET AL., THE POTENTIAL AMERICAN MARKET FOR 
GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS 1, 2 (2008) 
available at http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/0208_
GenericBiologicsStudy.pdf. (“Congress created an accelerated regulatory 
process for FDA approval of generic pharmaceuticals in 1984, under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, but the law covers only traditional, small-molecule 
pharmaceuticals and not biologics.”); see also Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic 
Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission that Biotech Patents Fail 
Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2006, at 1 (“[Generic] manufacturers 
currently are significantly limited in their ability to sell generic copies of 
biologics even after the pioneer biologic patents expire. As early biologics are 
starting to go off-patent, this regulatory mix-up is having a notable impact on 
the availability of biologics and raising the cost of health care.”). 
 41. Noel Courage & Ainslie Parsons, The Comparability Conundrum: 
Biosimilars in the United States, Europe and Canada, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
203, 209–12 (2011). 
 42. Law of Biologic Medicine: Hearing Before the S. Comm. of the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 24–25 (2004) (statement of Carole Ben-Maimon, M.D., 
President and Chief Operating Officer, Barr Research, Inc., Bala Cynwyd, 
Pennsylvania). 
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president of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association stated in 
2005: “Sound science already has enabled citizens in the 
European Union, Australia, India and South America to have 
access to these medicines. And, the EU estimates that it will 
save $2.8 billion from the market entry of just a few 
products . . . . Clearly, the U.S. must stop dragging its feet.”43 
In 2009, President Obama also urged Congress to act on a 
biosimilar pathway: “[W]e need to introduce generic biologic 
drugs into the marketplace . . . . But right now, there is no 
pathway at the FDA for approving generic versions of these 
drugs.”44 
C. DATA EXCLUSIVITY V. MARKET EXCLUSIVITY 
The BPCIA’s mission is to promote both innovation and 
accessibility of biologics.45 In striking the balance, the key point 
is how long of a period of exclusivity the FDA should provide 
for innovator biologics.46 Currently, the BPCIA provides a 
twelve-year FDA exclusivity for a new biologic entity (NBE).47 
A further question is whether this twelve-year exclusivity is 
data exclusivity or market exclusivity. The statute is currently 
unclear on this.48 
                                                          
 43. Kathleen Jaeger, President & CEO, GPhA, Speech at the Windhover 
FDA/CMS Summit (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://gpha.hfwebdev.com/
resources/2006/12/04/gpha-speech-windhover-fdacms-summit. 
 44. President Barack Obama, Address to the American Medical 
Association in Chicago (June 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/15/obama-ama-speech-full-
tex_n_215699.html. 
 45. See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 7001(b), 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010). 
 46. Lewis Krauskopf, Teva Executive Upbeat on Biogenerics in 2009, 
REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/12/23/businesspro-
us-teva-idUKTRE4BM4OA20081223 (noting the key point in the legislation of 
the FOB pathway is the amount of exclusivity that would be afforded to 
brand-name biotech drugs; generic drug makers like Teva want to limit it to 
seven years, while the brand name companies want fourteen years). Teva is 
the biggest generic drug company in the world, headquartered in Israel, 
having 46,000 employees, running annual revenue more than $20 billion in 
2012. About Us, TEVAPHARM.COM, http://www.tevapharm.com/About/Pages/
AboutUs.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. V 2011). 
 48. Margo Bagley, Patent Term Restoration and Non-Patent Exclusivity in 
the United States 22 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, No. 2011-25, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1899533. 
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The contrast between data and market exclusivity has 
significant implications for the general public.49 Data 
exclusivity prohibits FOB manufacturers from relying on the 
clinical trial data submitted by the innovator companies.50 
Notice that, by definition, ABLA is a regulatory pathway 
allowing FOB manufacturers to rely on innovators’ clinical data 
to establish safety and efficacy.51 Thus, if the twelve-year 
exclusivity is a data exclusivity, it essentially means ABLA is 
not available to FOB manufactures during the first twelve 
years after a reference biologic is approved.52 Market 
exclusivity, as opposed to data exclusivity, does not prohibit the 
FDA from accepting and reviewing an ABLA.53 Market 
exclusivity merely prohibits the FDA from approving an FOB 
to sell on the market.54 In other words, the FDA can accept and 
review an ABLA but will not approve it until the applicable 
market exclusivity expires.55 
Years of delay in introducing drug price competition equal 
to the FDA review period of FOBs is the difference between a 
data or market exclusivity.56 This delay of drug price 
                                                          
 49. See Kurt R. Karst, Tussle Over BPCIA “Market” Versus “Data” 
Exclusivity Continues; This Time the Generic Supporters Chime in, FDA L. 
BLOG (Jan. 21, 2011, 6:38 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_
hyman_phelps/2011/01/tussle-over-bpcia-market-versus-data-exclusivity-
continues-this-time-the-generics-side-chimes-in.html (asserting that generic 
supporters argue that interpreting the twelve-year FDA exclusivity as a data 
exclusivity, which prevents biosimilar (i.e., ABLA) submission has serious 
consequences and that consumers will have to endure an unknown period of 
delay of FDA review and approval that could stretch far beyond the twelve-
year total that was set in the legislation). 
 50. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 14 (noting that the five-year data 
exclusivity period for a new chemical entity (NCE) prevents generic drug 
companies from even filing an ANDA). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A) (stating that the biological product can 
establish biosimilarity to a reference product based upon data derived from 
analytical studies, animal studies, and clinical studies). 
 52. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 22. 
 53. See id. at 15–18 (explaining market exclusivity within the context of 
pediatric testing exclusivity and orphan drug exclusivity). Market exclusivity 
does not prevent generic companies from filing an ANDA, as in data 
exclusivity. During the market exclusivity period, the FDA can receive and 
review an ANDA but will not approve it until the reference drug’s market 
exclusivity expires. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Karst, supra note 49 (stating that data exclusivity which prevents 
ABLA submission stretches the market monopoly far beyond the twelve-year 
period); see also infra note 242 (establishing that a reasonable expectation for 
the FDA to approve an ABLA is about three to four years). 
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competition in biologics translates to tens of billions of medical 
expenses to the general public.57 
D. BIOSIMILAR V. INTERCHANGEABLE 
The BPCIA provides two categories of FOBs: (1) biosimilar, 
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 262 (k)(2); and (2) interchangeable, 
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 262 (k)(4).58 An FOB is biosimilar to a 
referenced biologic if the FOB (1) shows sufficient similarity 
through analytical, animal, and clinical studies; (2) utilizes the 
same therapeutic mechanism; (3) is used for the same 
indications; (4) uses the same drug administration and dosages; 
and (5) the quality control of the manufacture facility of the 
FOB assures safety, purity, and potency.59 An FOB is 
interchangeable with a referenced biologic, if it is (1) 
biosimilar; (2) expected to produce the same clinical result as 
reference drug in any given patient; and (3) the risk of 
switching between the FOB and reference drugs is not greater 
than the risk of continuous use of the reference drug.60 If an 
FOB is biosimilar, it has to be prescribed by the medical doctor; 
on the other hand, if an FOB is interchangeable, it can be 
switched by a pharmacist without informing the patient or the 
prescribing doctor.61 
                                                          
 57. Saurabh Aggarwal, What’s Fueling the Biotech Engine—2011 to 2012, 
30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1191, 1192 (2012) (showing that the annual sales 
of biologics was (in billions USD) $44.5 in 2007, $46.5 in 2008, $48.2 in 2009, 
$51.3 in 2010, and $53.8 in 2011). From the experience of small-molecule 
drugs, the price of a brand-name drug drops 50% instantly in the first year of 
the introduction of generic drug competition. Applying this dropping rate to 
biologics means the general public can save around $20 billion to $25 billion 
each year through drug-price competition, assuming each innovator biologic 
has an FOB competitor. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (Supp. V 2011). 
 59. § 262(k)(2). 
 60. § 262(k)(4). 
 61. § 262(i)(3) (“The term ‘interchangeable’ or ‘interchangeability’, in 
reference to a biological product that is shown to meet the standards described 
in subsection (k)(4), means that the biological product may be substituted for 
the reference product without the intervention of the health care provider who 
prescribed the reference product.”). 
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II. ANALYSIS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
ACCESSIBILITY 
A. PROMOTING INNOVATION 
The general public benefits from the innovation of new 
biologics because they provide life-quality improving 
treatments that did not exist before.62 It is important for the 
government to offer proper incentives to insure innovator drug 
companies in recouping the heavy investments and ensure 
their ability to fund new research to continue innovation.63 
Commentators view the twelve-year FDA exclusivity provided 
in 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) to be the most important and 
effective measure in the BPCIA to promote innovation.64 
This twelve-year FDA exclusivity is complementary to, 
independent from, and even stronger than patent exclusivity.65 
There are four reasons to support these assertions. First, this 
NBE exclusivity de facto covers more than one patent.66 The 
FDA grants this exclusivity on each new biological entity, 
which covers 2.7 patents on average.67 Second, this twelve-year 
exclusivity is likely to last longer than the active patent life 
                                                          
 62. See Patton, supra note 32 (stating that biologics are the wonder drugs 
of this age, promising to treat AIDS, cancer, Alzheimer’s, and multiple 
sclerosis). 
 63. Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the 
Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG 
DISCOVERY 479, 486 (2008) (stating that developing a new biologic entity costs 
around $1.24–$1.33 billion, and the cost has to be recouped from the sales of 
approved product). 
 64. Don Ware & Nick Littlefield, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS AND PATENT 
REFORM: WILL THEY DISCOURAGE VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY? 5 (2009), available at http://www.foleyhoag.com/
publications/ebooks-and-white-papers/2008/june/follow-on-bioligics-and-
patent-reform (“One of the issues of greatest importance involves the number 
of years of data exclusivity provided for a licensed biological product. ‘Data 
exclusivity’ refers to a period of time during which an FOB applicant is 
precluded from relying on clinical data from the innovator product as evidence 
of safety and effectiveness. Too short an exclusivity period could serve as a 
serious deterrent for VC investors if they believe the risk of early market 
entry of a biosimilar product will reduce the profitability of the branded 
compound. The loss of VC funding would seriously hinder, if not destroy, 
biotechnology innovation.”). 
 65. Grabowski, supra note 63, at 480 (stating that data exclusivity 
provides an important back-up to the patent system). 
 66. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent 
Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 327, 330 (2012). 
 67. Id. 
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during which innovator companies recoup their investments.68 
Third, FDA exclusivity is independent from patent 
exclusivity.69 Even if the patents covering the biologic are 
invalidated, the FDA exclusivity still stands.70 Fourth, FDA 
exclusivity practically eliminates the design-around issues.71 
Innovator companies often rely on method patents to protect 
the manufacturing process of the final products.72 These 
method patents are relatively easy to design around.73 FDA 
exclusivity prevents design-around because FDA exclusivity 
protects the final product, regardless of how it is 
manufactured.74 Even if a generic company develops a different 
manufacturing process to make the same biologic that does not 
infringe the innovator companies’ patents, the final product is 
still precluded from FDA approval.75 
The importance of using FDA exclusivity in promoting 
innovation can be further analyzed in three different 
perspectives: cost of capital and time in research and 
development, patent uncertainty, and drops in new drug 
applications. 
                                                          
 68. Linfong Tzeng, Follow-on Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 156 (2010) (stating that the twelve-year exclusivity 
runs potentially longer than patent protection). A detailed calculation is 
provided later in this Note showing that this twelve-year exclusivity lasts 
longer than an average, remaining active patent term of a biologic. 
 69. Id. (explaining that FDA exclusivity is independent from patent 
exclusivity and stating that “[t]his is potentially troubling as data exclusivity 
is unchallengeable in court” (emphasis added)). Whether the FDA decision in 
granting data exclusivity is challengeable is a complex legal issue in 
administrative law, which is out of the scope of this Note. My research shows 
that there is indeed no judicial challenge to an FDA decision granting data 
exclusivity. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 154–55. 
 72. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 66, at 330. 
 73. BIOTECH. INDUSTRY ORG., FTC BIOSIMILARS REPORT REBUTTAL 
(2009), available at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/FTC_biosimilars_
report_rebuttal.pdf (stating that patents covering biologics are often narrower 
and easier to “design around” than those of small-molecule drugs, and 
innovator companies need additional data exclusivity to secure their market 
monopolies). 
 74. See Tzeng, supra note 68, at 154–55. 
 75. Id. 
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1. Cost of Capital and Time in Research and Development 
The cost to bring a biologic drug to the market is higher 
than that for a small-molecule drug.76 This higher cost is partly 
due to the high manufacture quality required in making a 
biologic.77 
Any minor change in the manufacture or drug-delivery 
process can change the overall characteristic of a final biologic 
product.78 For example, with exactly the same manufacturing 
process, a manufacturer of interferon beta-1a produced two 
batches of products with drastically different 
immunogenicity.79 One batch was safe and effective, yet 
another batch caused serious immune responses.80 The only 
difference between the two batches was the manufacture site.81 
The manufacturing conditions that affect the properties of 
biologics generally include: the cell lines used to produce the 
biologics, culture/fermentation conditions, purification 
procedures, and container closure/packaging systems.82 Thus, a 
much higher quality control standard is required for biologics 
than for small molecule drugs.83 This high quality standard 
translates to higher capital investment in research and 
                                                          
 76. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of 
Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MGMT. & DECISION ECON. 
469, 477 (2007) (showing that, on average, it costs $1.24 billion to bring a 
biologic to the market compared to $899 million for a small-molecule drug). 
 77. FDA, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY 
TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 5–6 (2012) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291128.pdf 
(stating that different cell lines, raw materials, equipment, processes, process 
controls, and acceptance criteria are all likely to affect the quality of produced 
biologics). 
 78. See Nowicki, supra note 24, at 268. 
 79. Sungae S. Park et al., Biochemical Assessment of Erythropoietin 
Products From Asia Versus US Epoetin Alfa Manufactured by Amgen, 98 J. 
PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 1688, 1689 (2009). Biologics are proteins. The folding 
process of a protein is highly sensitive to environmental conditions (e.g., 
temperature, ion concentration, virus/bacteria contamination, etc.). A protein 
that is properly folded (i.e., having a proper three-dimensional structure) can 
be an effective drug. In contrast, the same protein that is not properly folded 
can cause serious immune response and death. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 77, at 4 (stating that even 
minor structural differences, including certain changes in glycosylation 
patterns, can significantly affect a protein’s safety, purity, and potency). It will 
be important to evaluate these differences. 
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development.84 In addition, the sensitive nature of biologics 
results in a longer period of clinical trial and regulatory 
review.85 The average period of clinical trial and regulatory 
review for a biologic is 97.7 months, which is 7 months longer 
than for a small-molecule drug.86 
Higher manufacturing cost translates to higher drug price, 
which consequently reduces the market demand.87 This 
reduction of market demand negatively impacts the 
profitability of innovator companies.88 Longer clinical trials and 
regulatory review periods mean a shorter active patent life to 
recoup the investment.89 This also negatively impacts the 
innovator companies’ profitability. The twelve-year FDA 
exclusivity provided in the BPCIA might be justified as 
increasing the profitability of innovator companies (i.e., 
providing a long enough monopoly period so that innovator 
companies can recoup their investments and continue to 
innovate).90 
2. Patent Uncertainty 
Patent uncertainty seriously affects the profitability of 
innovator drug companies.91 Generic drug companies are in an 
advantageous position in patent-invalidity challenges and have 
                                                          
 84. Compare Grabowski, supra note 63, at 480 (showing that in oncology, 
the area with the greatest concentration of biological entities, the mean cost is 
“US$1.016 billion compared with $868 million” in small-molecule drugs), with 
DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 76, at 477. 
 85. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 76, at 473; Grabowski, supra note 
63, at 481. 
 86. Grabowski, supra note 63, at 481. 
 87. Id. at 482 (“This [higher development cost of biologics] reflects the 
need to resolve novel manufacturing challenges at the R&D stage. By 
contrast, manufacturing process issues in R&D are typically more 
straightforward for drugs based on chemical synthesis [i.e., small-molecule 
drugs].”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 481–82. Because patent protection is a fixed term (i.e., twenty 
years from filing), the longer it takes for a drug to hit the market, the less 
patent term left to recoup the investment. 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. V 2011). 
 91. Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing Innovation 
and Access: Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCI. 370, 370 (2009) (“The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that increased competition from 
generic drugs resulted in a 12% loss in revenues on sales of brand-name 
drugs . . . . [The patent invalidity] challenges diminish [brand-name company] 
revenues and profits, contributing to the current crisis in industry R&D 
pipelines.”). 
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strong incentives to file such challenges.92 In addition, current 
developments in patent law make the invalidation of 
biotechnology-related patents especially easy.93 The twelve-
year FDA exclusivity provides a complementary protection to 
this patent vulnerability, because FDA exclusivity is a 
monopoly power independent of patent protection.94 In other 
words, even if the patents covering the innovator drugs or 
biologics were invalidated, the granted FDA exclusivity is 
unaffected. 
Recent Federal Circuit decisions further weaken the 
already vulnerable patents owned by innovator companies by 
imposing particularly stringent patent disclosure 
requirements.95 The Federal Circuit decisions imply that if a 
field of art is more predictive, such as mechanical engineering 
and software programming, less disclosure is required to fulfill 
the written description and enablement requirements.96 On the 
contrary, if the field of art is less predictive, such as chemistry 
or biotechnology, more disclosure is required.97 Recently, many 
                                                          
 92. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY, at viii (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf (“[G]eneric applicants prevailed in nearly 75% of the 
patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court decision.”); see also Higgins & 
Graham, supra note 91, at 370 (suggesting that generic companies have 
incentives to bring patent invalidity challenges, because the costs of 
challenging a patent are relatively small, i.e., “$5 million compared with the 
large average potential payoff of $60 million in the first 180 days alone”). 
 93. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1173–82 (2002) (noting that the 
Federal Circuit has adopted a particularly stringent disclosure standard for 
patenting macromolecules (i.e., biologics)). This heightened 35 U.S.C. § 112 
“written description” requirement ends up becoming the legal ground for 
invalidating many biotechnology and chemical patents. Id. 
 94. See Grabowski, supra note 63, at 480 (stating data exclusivity 
provides an important back-up to the patent system in cases where the 
patents could be invalidated). 
 95. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 93, at 1173 (“In contrast to the 
Federal Circuit decisions regarding software, recent decisions involving 
genetic material have imposed a stringent disclosure standard for patenting 
macromolecules.”). 
 96. Id. at 1157; e.g., N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 
942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“‘The computer language is not a conjuration of some 
black art, it is simply a highly structured language . . . . [T]he conversion of a 
complete thought (as expressed in English and mathematics, i.e. the known 
input, the desired output, the mathematical expressions needed and the 
methods of using those expressions) into a language a machine understands is 
necessarily a mere clerical function to a skilled programmer.’” (quoting In re 
Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980))). 
 97. Burk & Lemley, supra note 93, at 1157. 
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biotechnology patents have been invalidated because of these 
stringent requirements.98 In addition, the safe harbor created 
by the Hatch-Waxman Act in patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 271, 
significantly strengthens generic companies’ legal positions in 
patent-invalidity challenges by creating an exemption for 
generic drug companies that conduct research on patent-
protected reference drugs with the intention to gain FDA 
approval.99 This allows generic companies to gain thorough, 
hands-on knowledge regarding the targeted reference drugs 
and strengthens generic companies’ legal theories in patent-
invalidity challenges.100 
                                                          
 98. E.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The 
Federal Circuit invalidated a biologic patent, which disclosed methods for 
isolating a fragment of the DNA sequence coding for β–IF, a biologic, and for 
isolating messenger RNA coding for β–IF. Id. at 1167, 1170. The invalidation 
was largely based on the fact that Revel did not describe the actual sequence 
of the DNA at issue, id. at 1170–71, even if transferring an RNA sequence to 
DNA sequence is considered merely a mechanical routine that involves no 
technical challenge. See Reverse Transcriptase Enzymes, LIFE TECHNOLOGIES, 
http://www.lifetechnologies.com/us/en/home/life-science/pcr/reverse-
transcription/reverse-transcriptase-enzymes.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) 
(listing an enzyme cost per reaction as low as $1.15); see also Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The 
Federal Circuit invalidated a patent which claimed human insulin DNA but 
only disclosed rat insulin DNA, id. at 1567–68, disregarding that the research 
methods used in sequencing rat and human are exactly the same and that rat 
and human DNA sequences are 95% identical. See Nonconfidential Brief for 
Defendant-Appellee Eli Lilly & Co. at 43, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1175), 1996 WL 33419502 
(“The trial evidence established that a change in only four nucleotides of 
the rat DNA sequence would have yielded a sequence capable of producing 
human insulin.”). 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The safe harbor excuses 
generic drug companies from patent infringement in conducting otherwise 
infringing acts in relation to FDA submissions. Section 271(e)(1) states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development 
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products. 
Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that this safe harbor provision 
language is general and covers both small-molecule drugs and biologics. 
 100. See generally Paragraph Four Explained, PARAGRAPHFOUR.COM, 
http://www.paragraphfour.com/explained/why_challenge.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2013) (describing the incentives that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provides to generic companies). 
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Generic drug companies have strong incentives to 
challenge innovator companies’ patents.101 The Hatch-Waxman 
Act provides five-year data exclusivity to new chemical entities, 
during which generic drug companies cannot submit an ANDA 
referring to the patented drug’s clinical data.102 However, there 
is an exception that can shorten data exclusivity by one year.103 
An ANDA can be submitted at the end of the fourth year if the 
ANDA is submitted under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), which 
commences a patent-invalidation challenge.104 The first 
approved generic drug submitted under Paragraph IV is 
entitled to 180-day market exclusivity.105 During this market 
exclusivity period, the FDA will not approve another ANDA 
application (i.e., during this 180 days, the successful 
challenger’s generic drug will be the only generic drug on the 
market).106 This 180-day market exclusivity provides generic 
drug companies with strong incentives to challenge innovator 
drug patents.107 Indeed, patent-invalidation challenges 
commenced under Paragraph IV ANDA submissions generally 
increased in the past decade.108 The BPCIA provides similar 
mechanisms for FOB companies to raise patent-invalidation 
                                                          
 101. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 370 (suggesting generic 
companies have an incentive to bring patent-invalidity challenges). 
 102. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). The statute provides: 
[N]o application [i.e., ANDA] . . . may be submitted . . . before the 
expiration of five years from the date of the approval of the 
application under subsection (b) of this section [i.e., the approved 
reference drug], except that such an application [i.e., ANDA] may be 
submitted under subsection (b) of this section after the expiration of 
four years from the date of the approval of the subsection (b) 
application if it contains a certification of patent invalidity or 
noninfringement described in clause (iv) of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this 
section [i.e., paragraph IV challenge]. 
Id. (emphasis added). In sum, that statute specifically prevents a generic 
company from submitting an ANDA during the five-year data exclusivity 
period. 
 103. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv). An ANDA submitted under § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv), also 
known as a Paragraph IV submission, includes a patent-invalidation 
challenge. Higgins & Graham, supra note 93, at 370. This provision states: 
“such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale 
of the new drug for which the application is submitted.” § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
 104. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 105. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). This provision incentivizes generic companies to 
challenge weak patents. See FTC, supra note 92. 
 106. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). 
 107. See FTC, supra note 92. 
 108. Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 370 (displaying the number of 
Paragraph IV challenges (counts): 35 in 2001, 33 in 2002, 96 in 2003, 90 in 
2004, 81 in 2005, 87 in 2006, 162 in 2007, and 165 in 2008). 
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challenges.109 This ever-increasing number of patent-
invalidation challenges denotes that innovator drug companies 
suffer a high level of patent uncertainty, which drastically 
decreases the profitability of innovator drugs.110 Fosamax, a 
popular osteoporosis drug made by Merck that generates $3 
billion in annual sales, illustrates clearly the serious economic 
damages caused by patent uncertainty.111 Teva, the largest 
generic drug company in the world,112 brought an invalidation 
challenge under Paragraph IV and successfully invalidated 
Fosamax patents about four years before they were due to 
expire.113 Fosamax’s sales drastically decreased in the 
subsequent year of 2008 from $3 billion to $1.5 billion.114 In 
addition, Teva alone had 160 pending ANDAs in 2007, 
including 92 Paragraph IV challenges, which put at risk over 
$100 billion in sales.115 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported that 
generic companies prevailed in 75% of patent-invalidation 
challenges,116 while the challenge success rate across all 
technical fields was at 52%.117 This patent uncertainty 
seriously affects innovator drug companies’ ability to fund the 
                                                          
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 2011). The statute states: 
[An ABLA] applicant [e.g., an FOB company] shall provide to the 
reference product sponsor [i.e., innovator company] . . . a detailed 
statement that describes, on a claim by claim basis, the factual and 
legal basis of the opinion of the subsection (k) applicant [i.e., the FOB 
company] that such patent is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be 
infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological product that 
is the subject of the subsection (k) application. 
Id. 
 110. Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 370. 
 111. Id. at 370–71. 
 112. Kathlyn Stone, Top Generic Drug Companies, ABOUT.COM PHARMA, 
http://pharma.about.com/od/Generics/a/Top-Generic-Drug-Companies.htm 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 113. Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 371. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See FTC, supra note 92. 
 117. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK: 2008 PATENT 
LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES AND TIME-TO-TRIAL 10 
(2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/forensic-services/assets/
2008_patent_litigation_study.pdf. The PricewaterhouseCoopers report shows 
that, across all technical fields, 52% of the patent invalidations in which the 
alleged infringer is the plaintiff are successful. In contrast, the FTC reported 
that 75% of litigated biotechnology patents are declared invalid. This suggests 
that biotech patents are particularly vulnerable to patent-invalidity 
challenges. 
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research for new drugs.118 Many commentators argue that 
extended FDA exclusivity is necessary to promote innovation 
because it is independent from patent exclusivity and stays 
effective regardless of the validity of the covering patents.119 
3. Decrease in New Drug Applications 
The annual number of new drug applications generally 
decreased in the past fifteen years,120 despite significant 
development in biological science and technology.121 
Science and technology in the biomedical field has hugely 
advanced in the past sixty years.122 For example, during the 
1980s to 1990s, the number of drug candidates that could be 
synthesized by an individual chemist in a year increased 800-
fold.123 The speed of DNA sequencing increased a billion times 
since 1970.124 The time required to deduce a protein structure 
via X-ray diffraction decreased more than a thousand times.125 
Despite the advancement of technology, the number of new 
drugs approved per $1 billion spent on research and 
development has decreased by half every nine years since 
1950.126 This rate of decrease falls short roughly eighty-fold in 
inflation-adjusted terms.127 The average number of new drugs 
approved each year between 1995 and 1999 was 37.6. The 
number decreased to 30.0 during 2000–2004, and the number 
dropped to 20.2 during 2005–2009.128 
                                                          
 118. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 371 (“Economic research 
shows that there is a [pharmaceutical] market failure . . . .”). 
 119. Id. at 371; see also Grabowski, supra note 63, at 479. Contrary to the 
uncertainty inherent in the patent system, FDA exclusivity provides a defined 
period of monopoly with absolute certainty. 
 120. Cf. Is It True FDA Is Approving Fewer New Drugs Lately?, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/
UCM247465.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (displaying charts outlining the 
steady decrease of new molecular entity applications from 1996–2010). 
 121. Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical 
R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 191 (2012). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. K.I. Kaitin & J.A. DiMasi, Pharmaceutical Innovation in the 21st 
Century: New Drug Approvals in the First Decade, 2000–2009, 89 CLINICAL 
PHARMACEUTICALS & THERAPEUTICS 183, 185 (2011). 
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Commentators have suggested many possible reasons that 
explain the constant decrease of innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry.129 One explanation is that in vitro 
experiments conducted in the laboratory are not necessarily 
repeatable in humans, meaning the basic research is performed 
without benefiting the medical industry.130 Another 
explanation is the “low-hanging fruit” theory: fruit that hangs 
lower will get picked first. This is saying the relatively easier 
medical problems have been solved earlier, and what remains 
today are issues that are more difficult.131 Another explanation 
is it is harder to develop a better new drug.132 If a new drug is 
not better than existing therapies, the drug will likely be 
abandoned because the marginal profit does not justify the 
investments.133 
The explanations provided by commentators are 
speculative in nature and hard to verify.134 However, it is a fact 
that the number of approved new drugs has decreased steadily 
in the past two decades.135 This steady decrease in innovation 
may justify twelve-year FDA exclusivity136 that provides a 
longer period of market monopoly and a higher profit margin 
for innovator drug companies.137 
                                                          
 129. E.g., Scannell et al., supra note 121, at 193–97. Scannell et al. 
introduced several different theories to explain the drop in innovation, 
including: the “better than the Beatles” problem, the “cautious regulator” 
problem, the “throw money at it” tendency, and the “basic research brute-
force” bias. Id. at 193. Yet Scannell et al. admit that none of the theories are 
conclusive. 
 130. David F. Horrobin, Modern Biomedical Research: An Internally Self-
Consistent Universe with Little Contact with Medical Reality?, 2 NATURE 
REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 151, 152 (2003). 
 131. Id. at 151. 
 132. See Scannell et al., supra note 121, at 193 (“An ever-improving back 
catalogue of approved medicines increases the complexity of the development 
process for new drugs, and raises the evidential hurdles for approval, adoption 
and reimbursement.”). 
 133. Id. (“[T]he fruit [the authors’ metaphor for pharmaceutical drugs] that 
has been picked reduces the [average] value of the fruit that is left in the 
tree.”). 
 134. See id. at 198. By suggesting possible reasons to explain the steady 
decrease in new drug applications, Scannell et al. wanted to “provoke further 
analysis.” 
 135. Kaitin & DiMasi, supra note 128, at 185. 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. V 2011). 
 137. Cf. Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 371 (“A robust system of 
market innovation is built on financial incentives.”). 
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B. PROMOTING ACCESSIBILITY 
New biologics promise cutting edge therapies for the 
toughest diseases faced in our time.138 However, there will be 
no meaningful benefit to society if these therapies are 
prohibitively expensive and not accessible to the general 
public.139 
Unfortunately, many biologic therapies are prohibitively 
expensive.140 Biologics on average cost twenty times more than 
small-molecule drugs.141 For example, Enbrel, an anti-arthritis 
biologic, costs $20,000 per year, compared to $300 per year for 
the most expensive small-molecule drug treatment for 
arthritis.142 Treating breast cancer with a year’s worth of the 
biologic Herceptin can cost $48,000.143 Remicade, a biologic 
treatment for rheumatoid arthritis costs $20,000 a year.144 
Cerezyme, a treatment for a rare genetic disorder, Gaucher 
disease, which causes fatty deposits to build up in certain 
organs and bones, costs $200,000 to $300,000 per year.145 From 
1998 to 2006, the overall costs for biologics went up 505%, 
according to Kaiser Permanente.146 The overall sales of 
biologics reached around $100 billion in 2010, representing 
26% of the total cost of pharmaceuticals.147 
The ABLA aims to replicate the successful experience of 
ANDA to lower the drug price by introducing market 
                                                          
 138. See Patton, supra note 32 (stating that biologics are the “wonder 
drugs” of our age because they promise to treat AIDS, cancer, Alzheimer’s, and 
multiple sclerosis). 
 139. Victoria Colliver, Priced Out of Pain Relief: Insurers Balk at High 
Costs of Promising New Treatments, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 2007, at C1 (stating 
that insurance companies balk at covering the full price of biologic therapies 
because they are too expensive). 
 140. Patton, supra note 32 (“From 1998 to 2006, the costs of [biologic 
drugs] shot up 505 percent . . . .”). 
 141. Karen Tumulty & Michael Scherer, You Don’t Know Him (He’s a 
Lobbyist) but He May Be the Biggest Winner in Health-Care Reform. So Who 
Loses?, TIME, Nov. 2, 2009, at 38, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1931729,00.html. 
 142. Patton, supra note 32. 
 143. Tumulty & Scherer, supra note 141, at 38. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits—
Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1917 (2009); 
Andrew Pollack, Cutting Dosage of Costly Drug Spurs a Debate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/business/
16gaucher.html?pagewanted=all&_r. 
 146. Patton, supra note 32. 
 147. Roth, supra note 29, at 6. 
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competition.148 However, the ABLA faces distinct challenges 
that may hinder the purpose to promote accessibility. Part II.B 
explores four aspects of these challenges: complexity and 
delicacy of biologics, statutory and administrative ambiguity, 
excessively long FDA exclusivity, and evergreening. 
1. The Complexity and Delicacy of Biologics 
Many commentators opine that it is scientifically 
impossible to produce a bioequivalent generic biologic, as in 
generic small-molecule drugs, due to the natural complexity 
and delicacy of biologics.149 Biologic products are extremely 
sensitive to environmental conditions.150 Any minor change in 
the manufacturing process, such as temperature, water quality, 
or even external packaging, can change the overall safety and 
efficacy of biologics.151 
The story of Eprex highlights the extreme delicacy of 
biologics and the difficulties in making FOBs.152 Eprex, made 
by Janssen-Cilag,153 is an FOB of Epogen, made by Amgen.154 
Eprex, like Epogen, treats chronic kidney disease patients for 
aplasia.155 In 1998, incidence of pure red-cell aplasia, a rare 
disorder that manifests as a severe, sudden-onset anemia with 
complete absence of red blood cell precursors in the bone 
marrow, were noticed among the patients receiving Eprex.156 
The uncommon scenario was that the incidents happened in 
patients receiving Eprex in Europe, but not in the United 
                                                          
 148. Tzeng, supra note 68, at 135. 
 149. E.g., Park et al., supra note 79, at 1688–89. Many scientists believe 
that it is impossible to produce a generic biologic that is bioequivalent and 
bioavailable as the referenced biologic. This is the reason why the scientific 
communities use the term “follow-on biologics” instead of “generic biologics.” 
See Huub Schellekens, Biosimilar Epoetins: How Similar Are They?, 3 EUR. J. 
HOSP. PHARMACISTS 43, 43–44 (2004). 
 150. Park et al., supra note 79, at 1689. 
 151. Id.; see also JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FDA 
REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS, at i (2010) (“Biologics often require 
special handling (such as refrigeration) and are usually administered to 
patients via injection or infused directly into the bloodstream.”). 
 152. Katia Boven et al., The Increased Incidence of Pure Red Cell Aplasia 
with an Eprex Formulation in Uncoated Rubber Stopper Syringes, 67 KIDNEY 
INT’L 2346, 2346 (2005). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See EPOGEN, http://www.epogen.com (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) 
(directing the homepage to Amgen). 
 155. Boven et al., supra note 152, at 2346. 
 156. Id. 
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States.157 The reason turned out to be that the medical 
facilities in Europe administered Eprex using syringes with 
uncoated rubber stoppers instead of coated ones.158 The 
uncoated rubber stopper releases certain organic compounds 
that cause coagulation of the active proteins that induce 
increased immunogenicity.159 The whole incident highlights the 
natural delicacy of biologics, showing that even a minor change 
in the delivery equipment (e.g., rubber stopper), could be 
lethal.160 Commentators argue that this natural delicacy of 
biologics potentially renders the interchangeability of the 
FOB—the idea that the FOB can be substituted by a 
pharmacist without consulting medical doctors—
impracticable.161 
2. Statutory and Administrative Ambiguity 
The BPCIA has been enacted, but the statutory 
interpretation and administrative implementation are far from 
definite.162 Particularly, whether the twelve-year FDA 
exclusivity is a data or market exclusivity is still under 
debate.163 The provision of “exclusivity for reference product” of 
the BPCIA states: 
(A) Effective date of biosimilar application approval 
Approval of an application [i.e., ABLA] under this subsection may 
not be made effective by the Secretary until the date that is 12 years 
after the date on which the reference product was first licensed 
under subsection (a). 
(B) Filing period 
                                                          
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 2346–47. 
 159. See id. at 2352 (“[T]he evidence of [syringes with uncoated rubber 
stoppers’] capacity to increase the immunogenicity in experimental animals [ ] 
suggest[s] that [the organic compounds] were the critical contributory factor in 
the increased incidence of antibody mediated PRCA attributed to Eprex.”). 
 160. Id. at 2346–47. 
 161. E.g., Jonathan Stroud, The Illusion of Interchangeability: The Benefits 
and Dangers of Guidance-Plus Rulemaking in the FDA’s Biosimilar Approval 
Process, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 618 (2011). As of the time this Note was 
written, the FDA had not approved any FOB through ABLA. 
 162. Brian R. Dorn, Biosimilars Law in Limbo: An Update on Biosimilars 
and Politics, http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2012/02/biosimilars-law-in-limbo-
update-biosimilars-and-politics.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2013). 
 163. Id. 
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An application under this subsection may not be submitted to the 
Secretary until the date that is 4 years after the date on which the 
reference product was first licensed under subsection (a).164 
The four-year exclusivity in (B) is generally interpreted to 
be data exclusivity because the statutory language matches the 
definition of data exclusivity (i.e., the FDA will not accept any 
filing of an ABLA until four years after the reference biologic is 
approved because FOB manufacturers are precluded from 
relying on innovator data).165 The debate focuses on whether 
the twelve-year exclusivity provided in (A) is market or data 
exclusivity.166 
The FDA, on October 5, 2010, interpreted the twelve-year 
exclusivity in (A) as a market exclusivity.167 This is a 
reasonable interpretation for two reasons. First, the statutory 
language is: “Approval of an application under this subsection 
may not be made effective . . . until the date that is 12 years 
after the date on which the reference product was first 
licensed” matches the general understanding of market 
exclusivity (i.e., the FDA can accept and review an ABLA but 
will not approve it until the twelve-year market exclusivity 
expires).168 Second, reading (A) as data exclusivity renders (B) 
superfluous.169 However, Senators Hagan, Hatch, Enzi, and 
Kerry,170 and Representatives Eshoo, Inslee, and Barton171 
                                                          
 164. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, sec. 7002, § 262, 124 Stat. 119, 807 (2010). 
 165. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). 
 166. Emily K. Strunk, Debate Over Exclusivity in Biologics Provision of 
PPACA Heats Up, AKIN GUMP HEALTH REFORM RESOURCE CENTER (Feb. 14, 
2011), http://aghealthreform.com/2011/02/14/debate-over-exclusivity-in-
biologics-provision-of-ppaca-heats-up. 
 167. Notice of Public Hearing, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,498 (Oct. 5, 2010) (“The 
BPCI Act also includes, among other provisions: A 12-year period of marketing 
exclusivity from the date of first licensure of the reference product . . . .”). 
 168. Karst, supra note 49. 
 169. If (A) were a data exclusivity period then (B) would be superfluous, 
because a twelve-year period certainly covers a four-year period. In other 
words, if (A) is a data exclusivity period then (B) has no effect. 
 170. Letter from Senators Kay R. Hagan, Orrin Hatch, Michael Enzi, and 
John F. Kerry, U.S. Senate, to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r of Food and 
Drug Admin. (Jan. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Senators], available at 
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/1-7-11%20Senate%20Biologics%20letter%20to%
20FDA.pdf (clarifying that the BPCIA does not provide market exclusivity, but 
provides data exclusivity); see also Dorn, supra note 162. 
 171. Letter from Representatives Anna G. Eshoo, Jay Inslee, and Joe 
Barton, U.S. House of Representatives, to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r of 
Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.hpm.com/
2014] BIOLOGICS: INNOVATION AND ACCESSIBILITY 637 
responded to the FDA’s interpretation, clarifying that 
§ 262(k)(7)(A) is a data exclusivity. 
The difference between data or market exclusivity is 
significant; it means three to four years of delay in introducing 
FOB competition and tens of billions of dollars to the general 
public.172 The delay is the time for conducting clinical trials and 
FDA regulatory reviews.173 According to FDA guidance 
documents, ABLA applicants will generally be required to 
conduct a certain scale of clinical trials to show biosimilarity or 
interchangeability.174 After the clinical trials are completed, the 
regulatory review phase for the FDA to approve a biologic takes 
about sixteen months.175 In the case that the twelve-year 
exclusivity is data exclusivity, an FOB manufacturer will have 
                                                          
pdf/EIB%20Ltr%20FDA%20DEC%202010.pdf (clarifying the twelve-year 
exclusivity is a data exclusivity); see Dorn, supra note 162. 
 172. For reasons why ABLA is expected to take, on average, three to four 
years (including clinical trial phase and regulatory review phase) to be 
approved, see Trends in NDA and BLA Submissions and Approval Times, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/
Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/PDUFA/ucm209349.htm (last 
updated May 4, 2010). 
 173. Clinical trial and regulatory review are two different time periods. An 
innovator drug company submits an investigational new drug (IND) 
application to conduct the clinical trials. After the clinical trials are completed, 
the innovator company then submits a new drug application (NDA) to start 
the formal regulatory review process. See Running Clinical Trials, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/
RunningClinicalTrials/ucm155713.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2013) (listing 
the regulations governing clinical trials and regulatory reviews). 
 174. FDA, BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 
ACT OF 2009, at 8–12 (2012) [hereinafter BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM273001.pdf 
(noting that to demonstrate biosimilarity, an ABLA applicant has to conduct 
rigorous structural and functional comparisons showing minimal or no 
difference between the FOB and the referenced biologic (e.g., bench/lab tests); 
then, the ABLA applicant should produce comparative human clinical trial 
data showing human pharmaceutical kinetic (PK), pharmaceutical dynamic 
(PD), and immunogenicity studies in an “appropriate population”). This shows 
that the FDA will certainly require a level of clinical trials appropriate to the 
biologic. See also Makiko Kitamura & David Wainer, Biosimilars Lure Major 
Drugmakers into the Generics Biz, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 21, 
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-21/biosimilars-lure-
major-drugmakers-into-the-generics-biz (noting FOB companies might have to 
do even more clinical trials than those required by the FDA to convince 
skeptical medical practitioners to use their FOBs—“life-and-death drugs”). 
 175. Grabowski, supra note 63, at 481 (showing in Figure 1 that the 
regulatory review period for biologics takes an average of sixteen months). 
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to submit an ABLA after twelve years and take another three 
to four years to go through the clinical trials and regulatory 
review process.176 This de facto extends the monopoly period 
enjoyed by the innovator biologic manufacturers beyond twelve 
years. Whereas, if (A) were market exclusivity and (B) were 
data exclusivity, an ABLA could be submitted four years after 
the reference biologic was approved, and it could likely go 
through clinical trials and regulatory reviews before the 
twelve-year data exclusivity expired.177 Consequently, the FOB 
could be on the market the very day the twelve-year market 
exclusivity expires. 
Besides statutory ambiguity, the FDA regulations to 
implement the ABLA are also not clear. The FDA has ten years 
from the enactment of the BPCIA to finalize the regulatory 
structure of abbreviated biological license application, meaning 
the implementation standards are unlikely to be finalized until 
2020.178 On February 9, 2012, the FDA released three draft 
guidance documents that shed some light on the 
implementation of ABLA: (1) Scientific Considerations in 
Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product;179 (2) 
Quality Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a 
Reference Protein Product: Biosimilars;180 and (3) Biosimilars: 
Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation of the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009.181 The 
documents highlight that, in approving an FOB, the FDA will 
make a case-by-case determination, examining the totality of 
the evidence.182 In view of the natural delicacy and complexity 
                                                          
 176. See Karst, supra note 49 (stating that generic supporters argue that 
interpreting the twelve-year FDA exclusivity as a data exclusivity, which 
prevents biosimilar (i.e., ABLA) submissions, has serious consequences and 
that consumers will have to endure an indeterminate delay of FDA review and 
approval that could extend “far beyond the 12-year total that was set in the 
legislation”). 
 177. Cf. Bagley, supra note 48, at 15–18 (explaining market exclusivity 
within the context of pediatric testing exclusivity and orphan drug 
exclusivity). 
 178. Stroud, supra note 161, at 620. 
 179. SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 77. 
 180. FDA, QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY 
TO A REFERENCE PROTEIN PRODUCT: BIOSIMILARS (2012) [hereinafter QUALITY 
CONSIDERATIONS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291134.pdf. 
 181. BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 174. 
 182. SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 77, at 2; see also Steven 
Kozlowski et al., Developing the Nation’s Biosimilars Program, 365 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 385, 386 (2011). 
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of biologics, additional animal and clinical studies will 
generally be required.183 However, the scope and extent of such 
studies can be reduced if more extensive, fingerprint-like 
analyses are provided.184 Immunogenicity is considered a 
critical risk factor in assessing biosimilarity.185 The FDA is 
aware that pharmaceutical companies often make changes to 
the manufacturing process.186 The FDA will continuously 
monitor the quality of FOBs in regard to those changes.187 A 
biologic will be considered interchangeable with a reference 
product if the developer demonstrates similar clinical results in 
all types of patients, and the risk associated with switching 
between the two biologics is not greater than continuously 
using the reference biologic.188 
3. Excessively Long FDA Exclusivity 
The history of the Hatch-Waxman Act shows that the 
patent-invalidation challenge is an important mechanism to 
increase drug price competition.189 However, the twelve-year 
FDA exclusivity in the BPCIA, regardless of whether it is a 
data or market exclusivity, arguably vacates the incentives to 
challenge biological patents.190 This is because FDA exclusivity 
                                                          
 183. SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 77, at 10–19. 
 184. Id. at 7. 
 185. Id. at 7–10. 
 186. See QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 180, at 3 (“Since 1996, FDA 
has approved many manufacturing process changes for licensed biological 
products, based on a demonstration of product comparability before and after 
the process change, as supported by quality criteria and analytical testing and 
without the need for additional nonclinical data and clinical safety and/or 
efficacy studies.”). 
 187. Id. at 4 (stating that if the reference product and the proposed protein 
product cannot be adequately characterized, the FDA recommends that the 
sponsor consult the FDA for guidance). 
 188. Id. at 4. 
 189. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 91, at 370 (noting patent invalidity 
challenges brought by generic companies cut down brand-name companies’ 
profit significantly). 
 190. See Engelberg et al., supra note 145, at 1917 (noting that the 
Biosimilar Act guarantees innovator drug companies twelve years of market 
exclusivity for a new biologic agent before any biosimilar product could be 
approved, even in the absence of a valid patent); see also Tzeng, supra note 68, 
at 156 (stating that the twelve-year data exclusivity runs potentially longer 
than patent protection and demonstrating that this twelve-year exclusivity 
destroys the incentives for generic drug companies to bring patent-invalidity 
challenges because even if the underlying patents are invalidated, the FOB 
still has to wait for the twelve-year FDA exclusivity to expire to hit the 
market). In addition, because this twelve-year period is likely to last longer 
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remains effective even if the patents covering the reference 
biologics are invalidated and a twelve-year period after FDA 
approval is likely to run longer than the underlying patents.191 
This twelve-year FDA exclusivity is likely to live longer 
than the remaining active patent term.192 Active patent term 
refers to the overall patent life minus the overall 
administration time spent in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) and the FDA.193 The overall patent 
life is the summation of twenty years from filing, the patent 
term adjustment (PTA) granted by the USPTO, and the patent 
term extension (PTE) granted by the FDA.194 Put simply, PTA 
is granted if USPTO examination took more than three years 
from filing to issuance.195 The examination time in excess of 
three years will be granted as PTA.196 On average, the USPTO 
takes 33.7 months to review a patent application, slightly short 
of three years.197 Thus, PTA is likely to be zero. The period of 
PTE granted by the FDA is calculated by adding one-half of the 
time during which the drug is evaluated as an “investigational 
new drug” to the time the drug is pending approval at the 
FDA.198 However, the extension cannot exceed a maximum 
                                                          
than the remaining patent life, there is no point for generic drug companies to 
spend the litigation resources to invalidate the underlying patents. 
 191. Engelberg et al., supra note 145, at 1917. 
 192. See Tzeng, supra note 68, at 156 (stating that the twleve-year data 
exclusivity runs potentially longer than patent protection). I use the term 
“active patent term” to mean the patent period that the drug is actually on the 
market and generating revenue for the patentee. This active patent term is 
the overall patent life minus overall administration time. Overall patent life 
means the regular twenty years from filing, plus patent term adjustment, plus 
patent term extension. Overall administration time is the time spent in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to secure the patent and the FDA to get the 
drug approved. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (guaranteeing prompt 
patent and trademark office responses and specifying the conditions of 
granting patent term adjustments); see also Bagley, supra note 48, at 11 
(“[T]he USPTO is expected to take no more than three years to examine and 
issue a patent on an application. If the USPTO fails to issue a patent within 
three years from the actual U.S. filing date, it must extend the term of the 
resulting patent one day for each day beyond the three-year period until the 
patent issues.”). 
 196. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 11. 
 197. Jim Singer, How Long Does Patent and Trademark Prosecution Take?, 
IP SPOTLIGHT (Dec. 14, 2011), http://ipspotlight.com/2011/12/14/1780/. 
 198. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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period of five years,199 nor can it extend patent expiration to a 
date more than fourteen years after being approved by the 
FDA.200 The average PTE awarded by the FDA in approving a 
new drug is 43.2 months.201 The FDA takes an average of 110 
months to approve an innovator biologic, counting both the 
clinical phase and the regulatory review phase.202 
Thus, the average active patent term for a new biologic is 
(in months): 240 (20 years from filing) + 0 (patent term 
adjustment) + 43.2 (PTE) – 33.7 (PTO examination time) – 110 
(FDA approval time) = 139.5 months (11.65 years). Therefore, it 
is more likely than not that the patents covering innovator 
biologics will expire before the twelve-year FDA exclusivity 
expires.203 
In light of all the characteristics of this twelve-year FDA 
exclusivity (independent from and likely to last longer than the 
underlying patents), there is little to no incentive for FOB 
companies to challenge the patents.204 President Obama 
expressed his concern that the twelve-year FDA exclusivity tips 
the balance toward innovator drug companies and proposed to 
reduce it to seven years.205 Commentators even speculate that, 
                                                          
 199. § 156(g)(6)(A). 
 200. § 156(c)(3). 
 201. Charles Clift, The Value of Patent Term Extensions to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in the USA, 5 J. GENERIC MED. 201, 205 (2008) 
(showing that the average PTE awarded to the forty best selling drugs in 2006 
was 43.2 months). 
 202. See Grabowski, supra note 63, at 481–82 (showing that, on average, 
standard NCE/BLA applications take 110 months to be approved). An 
innovator biologic (i.e., BLA) takes on average 110 months to be approved, 
including both the time of clinical trial and regulatory review. 
 203. See Tzeng, supra note 68, at 156. 
 204. See Engelberg et al., supra note 145, at 1919 (noting that a rigid 
twelve-year exclusivity period essentially eliminates the need for innovator 
companies to defend any patents). 
 205. See Mike Palmedo, Obama’s Deficit Plan Would Reduce Data 
Exclusivity for Biologics and Ban Pay-for-Delay Patent Settlements, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Sept. 20, 2011), http://infojustice.org/archives/5585 (“[The 
Obama administration’s] proposal would reduce data exclusivity for biologic 
medicines to 7 years . . . and would ‘prohibit additional periods of exclusivity 
for brand biologics due [to] minor changes in product formulations, a practice 
often referred to as “evergreening.”’ The administration predicts that the 
shorter periods of data exclusivity will ‘encourage faster development of 
generic biologics while retaining appropriate incentives for research and 
development for the innovation of breakthrough products.’”); see also Dorn, 
supra note 162; Andrew Pollack, Obama Pushes More Competition on Biologic 
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, available at 
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in view of this excessively long twelve-year exclusivity, the 
ABLA pathway will not be used much because FOB companies 
will likely ignore ABLAs and file regular Biologics License 
Applications (BLAs), thus avoiding the delay of the twelve-year 
period.206 This creates a lose-lose-lose situation for the FOB 
companies, the innovator companies, and the general public, 
because FOB companies will not be able to save cost by relying 
on innovators’ clinical data, nor will the innovator drug 
company get to enjoy the full twelve-year exclusivity, nor will 
the general public enjoy the drug price competition.207 
4. Evergreening 
Evergreening strategy refers to patenting activities by 
innovator drug companies on ancillary aspects of the drugs.208 
The natural complexity of biologics provides convenient 
mechanisms for innovator drug companies to engage in 
evergreening, such as reformulation of drugs, new 
manufacturing processes, or quality-control methodologies.209 
                                                          
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/obama-pushes-more-
competition-on-biologic-drugs. 
 206. See Engelberg et al., supra note 145, at 1918 (“[M]anufacturers of 
potential follow-on products would probably prefer to ignore the new pathway 
and opt to file a standard BLA, which would not be subject to the 12-year 
delay. Any higher cost would be offset by the greater profit opportunity 
available to early market entrants. Therefore, as currently fashioned, the 
biosimilar legislation would have no value, because it would create a pathway 
that would scarcely be used. Innovators would not get the benefit of the 
exclusivity provision, and the public would not get the benefit of the enhanced 
price competition that would result from increasing the number of 
competitors.”). 
 207. Id. Engelberg speculates that the twelve-year FDA exclusivity creates 
a lose-lose-lose situation among the innovator company, FOB company, and 
the general public. Innovator companies will not enjoy the twelve-year 
exclusivity because FOB companies will design around and go through regular 
BLA to avoid the delay of the twelve-year period. FOB companies will not be 
able to enjoy the cost-saving, fast track ABLA because regular BLA is 
preferred. The general public will not be able to enjoy low price biologics 
because FOB companies will have to price higher in order to recoup the 
investment for going through regular BLA. 
 208. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 66, at 327–28 (describing 
evergreening as securing or acquiring patents on ancillary aspects with 
doubtful validity in order to delay generic competition). 
 209. See Christopher Weaver et al., Biotech Drugs Still Won’t Copy, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2013, at B1 (noting that innovator biologic companies can gain 
patents on manufacturing procedures and formulations to extend the market 
monopoly period). The CEO of AbbVie Inc., a spin-off of Abbott Laboratories, 
said that AbbVie has more than 200 such patents on Humira, an innovator 
biologic treating arthritis. Id. 
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For example, an innovator biologic company can secure a 
patent on a reformulation of a biologic, improving certain 
peripheral effects.210 Then, right before the expiration of the 
twelve-year exclusivity, the innovator drug company can obtain 
a quick approval of the reformulated biologic by referring to its 
own clinical data and enjoy a renewed twelve-year monopoly.211 
The evergreening issue was debated in Congress.212 
Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator Kay Hagan sent a letter on 
January 7, 2011 calling on the FDA to interpret the BPCIA 
such that innovator drug companies should get a renewed 
twelve years of exclusivity if manufacturers alter an existing 
product to improve safety or potency.213 Senator Sherrod Brown 
and proponents of generic companies disagreed with this 
interpretation and showed great concerns that this tweak-to-
renew tactic would increase costs for consumers, businesses, 
and taxpayers.214 President Obama also expressed his intention 
to prohibit evergreening.215 Siding with the President, Pamela 
Jones Harbour, the then Commissioner of the FTC, expressed 
her opinion in June of 2009: “no additional period of branded 
exclusivity is needed to spur the development of new drug 
products” because pioneer biologics are already covered by 
varied patents and market-based exclusivities, providing 
strong incentives to innovate.216 
                                                          
 210. See Alicia Mundy, Biotech Firms Fight Generics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870388920457607825226
0327210.html (noting that Senators Hatch and Hagan stated in a letter to the 
FDA that companies should get an additional twelve years of exclusivity if an 
existing product is altered to improve safety or potency). 
 211. Id. Note that the twelve-year exclusivity excludes follow-on 
competitors but not the original data owner. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Letter from Senators, supra note 170 (“If a manufacturer modifies an 
approved product to produce a change in safety, purity or potency, the 
modified product is rightly considered a new product. It will be protected by 
the data exclusivity provisions afforded new products. Exclusivity on the first 
generation product will expire as scheduled.”). 
 214. See Mundy, supra note 210. 
 215. See Palmedo, supra note 205 (noting that the Obama administration 
proposes to prohibit additional periods of exclusivity for brand biologics due to 
minor changes in product formulations, a practice often referred to as 
“evergreening”). 
 216. See Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, FTC, Oral Statement Before the 
Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States 
House of Representatives, Emerging Health Care Issues: Follow-on Biologic 
Drug Competition (June 11, 2009), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090611/testimony_
harbour.pdf. 
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A recent case in 2012, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., provides an example of 
evergreening in therapies that require a high level of quality 
control, such as biologics.217 Momenta Pharmaceuticals 
(Momenta) and Amphastar Pharmaceuticals (Amphastar) are 
both generic drug companies making generic versions of 
Lovenox (enoxaparin), produced by Aventis Pharmaceuticals.218 
Enoxaparin requires a high level of continuous quality 
control.219 In order to ensure quality, the FDA required both 
Momenta and Amphastar to profile their products via mass 
spectroscopy, nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, 
modifying reagents, or modifying enzymes, to show their 
enoxaparin is equivalent to Lovenox.220 Amphastar was the 
first to be approved by the FDA.221 However, Momenta owns a 
method patent (Patent No. 7,575,886, “the ‘866 patent”) in 
quality control (i.e., an evergreening patent) to show its product 
is equivalent to Lovenox.222 Before Amphastar’s enoxaparin 
could reach the market, Momenta asserted infringement 
actions alleging that Amphastar inevitably infringed its ‘866 
patent.223 Amphastar’s enoxaparin eventually reached the 
market after Momenta.224 This scenario highlights an 
evergreening strategy: a quality-control patent can 
conveniently be used to extend a market monopoly in therapies 
                                                          
 217. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 
1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1349–50. 
 220. Id. at 1350–51. 
 221. Id. at 1351. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1351–62. The majority ruled against Momenta in Momenta v. 
Amphastar. Judges Moore and Dyk reasoned that even if Amphastar infringed 
Momenta’s profiling method, patent ‘866, it was exempted under the safe 
harbor (35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)) because the quality control and profiling of the 
product falls within the statutory language: “reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs . . . .” Id. at 1357–59. The 
majority ruling partially answers the concern of using quality-control and 
product-profiling patents to extend market monopoly. However, Judge Rader 
dissented, arguing that the safe harbor should be limited to pre-approval 
activities. Id. at 1361–76 (Rader, J., dissenting). If Judge Rader’s point of view 
subsequently prevails, the activities of continuous quality-controlling and 
profiling after an FOB is approved will constitute patent infringement. In 
other words, brand-name companies can assert quality control method patents 
to deter FOBs. 
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that require continuous, high-quality monitoring, such as 
biologics.225 
C. BIOSIMILAR—A GAME OF BRAND-NAME COMPANIES 
Maybe the wrestling between the proponents for 
innovators and FOB companies will eventually be moot because 
the biosimilar game is likely among brand-name companies.226 
In 2009, the FTC stated the following in one report: 
FOB products are likely to take eight to ten years to develop, and 
their development will likely cost between $100 and $200 million. 
These amounts differ substantially from the product development 
costs for small-molecule generic drugs, which typically take three to 
five years to develop and cost between $1 and $5 million.227 
In light of the high cost to enter the market, the dynamics 
of biosimilar competition will likely be “brand-name to brand-
name,” rather than “brand-name to generic” competition.228 
Indeed, Merck and Pfizer, both recognized as brand-name 
companies, have started to develop FOBs referencing Amgen 
and Roche’s biologic products.229 
                                                          
 225. See Weaver et al., supra note 209 (stating that Merck retreated from a 
plan to develop an FOB of Enbrel, an innovator biologic made by Amgen, 
because Amgen recently gained a new patent on Enbrel). 
 226. See Kitamura & Wainer, supra note 174 (noting it would take about 
$100 to $200 million to develop an FOB, much higher than the $50 million 
needed to make a generic small-molecule drug). The higher threshold makes 
biosimilar development likely to be a game among big pharmaceutical 
companies. Id. 
 227. FTC, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION 6 (2009) [hereinafter EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf. The 
report highlights that biosimilars are a game for deep pockets. The medium or 
small generic firms are not likely to have sufficient capital and equipment to 
participate in the competition. Therefore, biosimilar development is likely to 
be a war among brand-name companies. 
 228. See Linda A. Johnson, Merck, Samsung JV Team Up on Biosimilar 
Medicines, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-02-20/merck-samsung-jv-team-up-on-
biosimilar-medicines (noting that Merck, a brand-name drug company, 
collaborated with Samsung in a joint venture to develop biosimilars). 
 229. See Peter Loftus, Merck Teams Up with Parexel on Biosimilars, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527
48704803604576078160079036994.html (noting that Merck, Pfizer, and some 
other big brand-name drug makers view biosimilars as a big market 
opportunity and aim to participate as FOB companies); see also Pfizer 
Carrying out Biosimilar Trastuzumab Trial in US, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS 
INITIATIVE (Oct 19, 2012), http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/
Pfizer-carrying-out-biosimilar-trastuzumab-trial-in-US. Pfizer is carrying out 
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D. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: A SIX-YEAR DATA EXCLUSIVITY 
AND A DYNAMIC SIX-TO-TWELVE-YEAR MARKET EXCLUSIVITY 
A rigid, twelve-year FDA exclusivity, regardless of whether 
it is data or market exclusivity, is too long and tips the scale in 
favor of innovator companies. As articulated previously, a 
twelve-year exclusivity period is likely to out-live the 
underlying patents in the majority of the cases and eliminates 
the incentives to challenge these patents.230 This works against 
the public interest of promoting drug accessibility, especially in 
view of the high market entrance barrier and evergreening 
tactics in biologic therapies.231 However, reducing the FDA 
exclusivity straight to a rigid seven-year time frame, as 
President Obama suggested, might tip the scale too favorably 
toward the FOB companies’ side.232 In striking a better 
balance, this Note suggests a regulatory scheme of a six-year 
data exclusivity and a six-to-twelve-year dynamic market 
exclusivity. The dynamic market exclusivity would be 
adjudicated by a panel of experts from both the FTC and the 
FDA at the end of the six-year period. 
Under this scheme, innovator companies have six years of 
absolute market monopoly covered by patent exclusivity, data 
exclusivity, and market exclusivities.233 During this period, 
                                                          
an FOB referencing Trastuzumab, a biologic made by Roche to treat breast 
cancer; Trastuzumab is Roche’s third-best-selling drug. Id. 
 230. See supra Part II.B. In a nutshell, Part II.B. argues that (1) in view of 
the natural delicacy of biologics, it is difficult to produce biosimilars; to enter 
the biologics market requires large capital and advanced technologies 
compared to entering the market of small-molecule drugs; (2) a twelve-year 
exclusivity period is likely to out-live the underlying patents in the majority of 
the cases and eliminates the incentives to challenge the patents; and (3) a 
twelve-year period is likely to aggregate the negative impacts of evergreening 
tactics on drug-price competition, especially if the FDA adopted the tweak-to-
renew policy. 
 231. See supra Part II.B. 
 232. See Palmedo, supra note 205. President Obama and proponents of 
generic drug companies supported a seven-year exclusivity. This Note’s 
Author believes a rigid seven-year period is too short and is not sufficient for 
innovator companies to recoup their investments. The reasons that justify 
innovator companies having FDA exclusivity longer than seven years are 
articulated in Part II.A of this Note: (1) it costs a lot more to develop a biologic 
therapy then a small-molecule drug; (2) biotechnology patents are particularly 
vulnerable to being challenged; and (3) innovation decreases steadily under 
the Hatch-Waxman incentive system. 
 233. See generally Bagley, supra note 48. During the first six years, an 
innovator company would have all three kinds of market exclusivities: patent 
exclusivity, data exclusivity, and market exclusivity. Patent exclusivity 
prevents FOB companies from using, selling, or importing the protected 
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innovator companies will face no competition, even if the 
underlying patents are invalidated.234 At the end of the six-year 
period, the FTC and the FDA will assemble an expert panel to 
adjudicate how many more years of market exclusivity will be 
granted.235 In the adjudication process, there should be trial-
type procedures allowing the innovator companies to submit 
briefs, present experts, answer questions, and orally advocate 
their positions.236 The benefit of having this adjudication at the 
end of the six-year period is that it allows the FTC and the 
FDA to evaluate the sales profile of the biologic during that 
first five to six years.237 This sales information is extremely 
helpful in evaluating how many more years of market 
exclusivity should be granted to allow innovator companies to 
recoup their investments.238 
Some commentators might argue that this individualized 
adjudication is inefficient and will consume heavy 
administrative resources. This Note disagrees. According to the 
FDA, the number of approved BLAs was four in 2008, seven in 
2009, six in 2010, and six in 2011.239 Since the annual number 
                                                          
biologic. Data exclusivity prevents FOB companies from submitting an ABLA. 
Market exclusivity prevents the FDA from approving an ABLA. The 
overlapping protection of all three exclusivity powers provides innovator 
companies with absolute market monopoly power. 
 234. See Tzeng, supra note 68, at 156 (explaining that FDA exclusivity is 
independent from patent exclusivity). 
 235. See generally EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES, supra note 227. The 
FTC has the expertise in balancing customer protection and market monopoly 
(e.g., antitrust enforcement). The FDA has the expertise in assessing the 
technology and clinical effects of the biologic. Thus, an expert panel from both 
the FTC and the FDA will be ideal in adjudicating the market exclusivity. 
 236. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557 (2012). Administrative formal/informal 
adjudication processes specified in this code might shed some light on this 
market exclusivity adjudication process. 
 237. See Grabowski, supra note 63, at 485 (demonstrating that mean sales 
of a biologic therapy grow almost linearly from the first year, at $128 million 
per year, to the ninth year, peaking at $713 million per year; the sales slightly 
decrease after the ninth year but remain above $600 million through the 
fourteenth year). Thus, having the first five to six years of sales data helps the 
expert panels from the FTC and the FDA to accurately predict how many 
more years an innovator company will need to recoup its investment. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See FDA, CDER DRUG AND BIOLOGIC APPROVALS FOR CALENDAR 
YEAR 2008, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Drugand
BiologicApprovalReports/UCM200924.pdf; FDA, CDER DRUG AND BIOLOGIC 
APPROVALS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2009, available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandA
pproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/PriorityNDAandBLAApprovals/UC
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of approved BLAs constantly remains single digit, adjudication 
for each BLA will not impose undue burden on the 
administrative system. 
In promoting innovation, this suggested scheme recognizes 
the heavy up-front investment in developing a new biologic 
therapy and provides mechanisms to adjudicate individualized 
market exclusivity for innovator companies to recoup their 
investments.240 The innovator companies may present evidence 
showing how much money they have spent on bringing the 
biologic to the market and argue for how many more years they 
need to recoup the investments. In promoting accessibility, this 
suggested scheme avoids the potential extension of market 
monopoly due to FOB companies’ inability to complete the 
ABLA approval process before the expiration of innovators’ 
market exclusivity.241 This is because FOB companies can 
submit ABLAs at the end of the six-year period (i.e., the 
expiration of the data exclusivity, under this scheme) and use 
the expected three to four years of ABLA approval process to 
finish the required clinical trials and regulatory review.242 The 
                                                          
M090995.pdf; FDA, CDER DRUG AND BIOLOGIC APPROVALS FOR CALENDAR 
YEAR 2010, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Drugand
BiologicApprovalReports/UCM260585.pdf; FDA, CDER DRUG AND BIOLOGIC 
APPROVALS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandA
pproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM276984.pdf. 
 240. See Grabowski, supra note 63, at 489. 
 241. See supra Part II.B.2. If the twelve-year FDA exclusivity is explained 
as a data exclusivity, ABLA applicants can submit applications only after the 
expiration of the twelve-year data exclusivity and take another three to four 
years to finish the FDA approval process. This de facto extends innovators’ 
market monopoly period. 
 242. Trends in NDA and BLA Submissions and Approval Times, supra 
note 172. Since no ABLA has been approved by the FDA yet, no one knows 
how long it would take for an FOB to be approved by the FDA. But we can do 
some guess-work from the empirical data of innovator biologics and generic 
small-molecule drugs. The average approval time for innovator biologics (i.e., 
BLAs) should be the upper limit for an ABLA because the ABLA refers to a 
BLA’s clinical data. This means a much smaller scale of clinical trials and that 
it should take a shorter time to be approved than a BLA. On the other hand, 
the average approval time for generic small-molecule drugs (i.e., ANDA) 
should establish the lower limit for ABLA, because biologics normally take 
longer to be approved than small-molecule drugs. See Grabowski, supra note 
63, at 482. An innovator biologic (i.e., BLA) takes on average 110 months to be 
approved, including both the time for clinical trials and regulatory review. See 
Kurt R. Karst, OGD’s ANDA Backlog and Median ANDA Approval Times Are 
Up—WAY UP! “The Solution Lies in Resources,” Says FDA Commissioner 
Hamburg, FDA L. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
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ABLA approval process will likely conclude before, or at least 
not long after, the expiration of the referenced biologic’s market 
exclusivity.243 
This suggested scheme strikes a good balance for the 
incentives to bring patent invalidity challenges. The overall 
number of patent challenges will decrease compared to the 
current situation in small-molecule drugs. However, it does not 
eliminate the incentive to initiate patent-invalidation 
challenges, contrary to the current rigid twelve-year FDA 
exclusivity. Invalidation challenges will be commenced by FOB 
companies in the case that the remaining patent term of the 
referenced biologic is longer than the adjudicated market 
exclusivity.244 The time difference between the remaining 
patent term and the adjudicated market exclusivity provides 
the additional profit margin that FOB companies gain by 
invalidating the patents.245 If the market exclusivity is equal to 
or longer than the remaining patent terms, there is no 
incentive for FOB companies to invalidate innovators’ patents 
because there is no extra profit margin.246 
                                                          
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/02/ogds-anda-backlog-and-median-anda-
approval-times-are-up-way-up-the-solution-lies-in-resources-says-f.html 
(showing that ANDA median approval time is 26.7 months; approximately two 
years). Thus, a reasonable expectation is for an ABLA to be approved within 
three to four years. 
 243. See Karst, supra note 49 (referencing a problem which this suggested 
scheme solves). A rigid twelve-year data exclusivity will cause unknown delay, 
perhaps stretching far after the expiration of the twelve-year data exclusivity 
period. This is because under the suggested scheme, FOB companies can 
submit ABLAs at the time the six-year data exclusivity expires and go 
through the clinical trial and regulatory review processes while the reference 
product market exclusivity is still ongoing. The ABLA approval process of, on 
average, three to four years is likely to be finished before, or at least not long 
after, the reference product market exclusivity expires. 
 244. See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
(Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). If the patents 
covering the reference biologic are invalidated, FOB companies can sell the 
competing product at the expiration of the reference biologic’s market 
exclusivity. See generally Ware & Littlefield, supra, note 64. If the reference 
biologic’s market exclusivity is equal to or longer than the underlying patents, 
FOB companies gain nothing by invalidating the patents because the 
biosimilar products will not be approved by the FDA until the market 
exclusivity expires anyway. 
 245. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 66, at 328 (discussing the process 
and incentives for generic drug-makers to challenge patents). 
 246. Id. 
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Finally, innovator companies will have a harder time 
engaging in evergreening tactics under this scheme.247 During 
the trial-type adjudication, the experts from the FTC and the 
FDA and advocates from innovator companies will review 
factual information and engage in rigorous deliberation. This 
deliberation process makes it difficult for innovator companies 
to justify evergreening.248 
CONCLUSION 
Biologics promise cutting-edge therapies treating the 
toughest diseases faced in our time.249 In October 2010, the 
BPCIA was enacted, establishing an abbreviated approval 
pathway for follow-on biologics, known as the biosimilar 
pathway.250 Analogous to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the central 
mission of the BPCIA is to balance two competing interests: 
innovation and accessibility.251 One of the most important 
provisions in the BPCIA is 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A), which 
provides twelve-year FDA exclusivity.252 At the time of this 
writing, it remains unclear whether this twelve-year FDA 
exclusivity is data or market exclusivity.253 This Note concludes 
that this rigid twelve-year FDA exclusivity tips the balance 
toward innovation and compromises accessibility.254 To strike a 
better balance, this Note proposes a six-year data exclusivity 
period and a six-to-twelve-year dynamic market exclusivity 
                                                          
 247. See generally id. (presenting responses to evergreening). In the 
adjudication process, the innovator companies will submit briefs, present 
experts, and orally advocate their positions for a longer period of market 
exclusivity. But if the biologic product at issue is a modified version of a 
previous product with minor or insignificant safety and efficacy 
improvements, the company will have a harder time convincing the expert 
panel to grant extra market exclusivity. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Patton, supra note 32. 
 250. See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 7001, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010). 
 251. See id. § 7001(b), 124 Stat. at 804; see also Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.        
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 
and 35 U.S.C.). 
 252. See Krauskopf, supra note 46. 
 253. See Karst, supra note 49 (noting that the Commissioner of the FDA 
interpreted the twelve-year FDA exclusivity as a market exclusivity). On the 
other hand, some Senators and Representatives interpreted the twelve-year 
FDA exclusivity as data exclusivity. Id. 
 254. See supra Part II.B.3 of this Note for detailed articulations. 
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scheme.255 In this scheme, experts from the FTC and the FDA 
will individually adjudicate a six-to-twelve-year market 
exclusivity period for each innovator biologic to ensure that 
innovator companies have a sufficient exclusive period to 
recoup their investment.256 This scheme allows ABLAs to be 
submitted at the expiration of the six-year data exclusivity 
period and allows FOBs to enter the market at or near the 
expiration of the market exclusivity period.257 The scheme 
reduces, yet does not eliminate, the incentives to challenge 
innovators’ patents.258 Finally, the scheme has the potential to 
halt evergreening.259 Thus, this regulatory scheme with six-
year data exclusivity and six-to-twelve-year dynamic market 
exclusivity strikes a better balance between innovation and 
accessibility. 
                                                          
 255. See supra Part II.D of this Note for detailed articulations. 
 256. See supra Part II.D. 
 257. See Karst, supra note 49. 
 258. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 259. See generally Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 66. 
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